Optimal monetary policy with state-dependent pricing by Nakov, Anton & Thomas Borao, Carlos
OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY WITH 
STATE-DEPENDENT PRICING
Anton Nakov and Carlos Thomas
Documentos de Trabajo 
N.º 1130
2011
OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY WITH STATE-DEPENDENT PRICING
OPTIMAL MONETARY POLICY WITH STATE-DEPENDENT 
PRICING
Anton Nakov
BANCO DE ESPAÑA AND ECB
Carlos Thomas
BANCO DE ESPAÑA
Documentos de Trabajo. N.º 1130
2011
The Working Paper Series seeks to disseminate original research in economics and fi nance. All papers 
have been anonymously refereed. By publishing these papers, the Banco de España aims to contribute 
to economic analysis and, in particular, to knowledge of the Spanish economy and its international 
environment. 
The opinions and analyses in the Working Paper Series are the responsibility of the authors and, therefore, 
do not necessarily coincide with those of the Banco de España or the Eurosystem. 
The Banco de España disseminates its main reports and most of its publications via the INTERNET at the 
following website: http://www.bde.es.
Reproduction for educational and non-commercial purposes is permitted provided that the source is 
acknowledged.  
© BANCO DE ESPAÑA, Madrid, 2011
ISSN: 0213-2710 (print)
ISSN: 1579-8666 (on line)
Depósito legal: M. 44027-2011
Unidad de Publicaciones, Banco de España
Abstract
We study optimal monetary policy from the timeless perspective in a general state-
dependent pricing framework. Firms are monopolistic competitors and are subject 
to idiosyncratic menu cost shocks. We fi nd that, under isoelastic preferences and no 
government spending, strict price stability is optimal both in the long run and in response 
to aggregate shocks. Key to this fi nding is an “envelope” property: at zero infl ation, a 
marginal increase in the rate of infl ation has no effect on fi rms’ profi ts and therefore has no 
effect on the rate of price adjustment. We offer an analytic solution which does not rely on 
local approximation or effi ciency of the steady-state.
Keywords: monetary policy, state-dependent pricing, monopolistic competition.
JEL classifi cation: E31.
Resumen
Estudiamos la política monetaria óptima desde una perspectiva atemporal en un modelo 
general de fi jación de precios dependiente del estado (state-dependent pricing). Las 
empresas tienen poder monopolístico y están sujetas a perturbaciones idiosincráticas a 
sus costes de menú. Encontramos que, bajo preferencias iso-elásticas y en ausencia de 
gasto público, la estabilidad estricta de precios es óptima tanto en el largo plazo como 
en respuesta a perturbaciones agregadas. La clave de este resultado es una propiedad 
«envolvente»: con infl ación cero, un incremento marginal en la tasa de infl ación no tiene 
ningún efecto sobre el benefi cio de las empresas y por tanto tampoco sobre la frecuencia de 
ajuste de los precios. Ofrecemos una solución analítica que no requiere de aproximaciones 
locales ni de la efi ciencia del estado estacionario.
Palabras Claves: política monetaria, fi jación de precios dependiente del estado, competencia 
monopolística.
Código JEL: E31.
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1 Introduction
A key normative question in monetary economics is the design of optimal monetary policy. An
extensive literature studies this question under the assumption that the timing of price changes
is given exogenously, as in the Calvo (1983) model with a constant adjustment rate.1 Useful as
it is as a first approximation, this literature nevertheless is subject to the Lucas (1976) critique:
the timing of price changes in principle should not be treated as independent of policy (see e.g.
Golosov-Lucas, 2007).
This paper studies optimal monetary policy with state-dependent pricing by monopolistically
competitive firms. Individual prices are sticky because firms are subject to random idiosyncratic
lump-sum costs of adjustment à la Dotsey, King and Wolman (1999). In this model, each firm
changes its price only if the increase in value due to price adjustment exceeds the “menu cost”. As a
result, the rate at which firms reoptimize prices depends on the adjustment gains. This framework
is very flexible since it nests a variety of pricing specifications, including the Calvo model and the
fixed menu cost model as extreme limiting cases (Costain and Nakov, 2011). Apart from pricing
being state-dependent, our setup follows closely the standard New Keynesian model with Calvo
pricing (e.g. Benigno and Woodford, 2005). In particular, the monetary authority is assumed to
set the nominal interest rate, with money’s role being only that of a unit of account. An important
distinction with Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1999), Woodford (2002), and Yun (2005), is that we
assume no production subsidy to offset the markup distortion due to monopolistic competition.
The steady state of the economy is thus inefficient.
As in Woodford (2003), we derive the optimal plan from the timeless perspective.2 We demon-
strate analytically that, if preferences are isoelastic and there is no government spending, it is
optimal to commit to zero inflation both in the long run and in reaction to shocks. This result
holds for a general specification of the menu cost distribution. The optimal allocation is one in
which price markups are positive but constant, output is at its natural (flexible-price) level and
price dispersion is minimized. This prescription coincides with the one obtained under Calvo
pricing (Benigno and Woodford, 2005).
The intuition for the optimality of zero inflation is as follows. Relative to Calvo pricing, the
stochastic menu costs model implies two additional welfare effects of inflation. First, firms must
spend real resources (menu costs) on adjusting nominal prices. This distortion is minimized at
zero inflation, because under such a policy all firms end up being at their optimal price. The
second effect is somewhat more subtle. The main difference between exogenous-timing and state-
dependent pricing models is that price adjustment frequencies are endogenous in the latter. A
1E.g. Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1999), Woodford (2002, 2003), Yun (2005), Benigno and Woodford (2005).
2That is, the plan ignores policymakers’ incentives to behave differently in the initial few periods, exploiting the
private sector’s expectations that had formed prior to the plan’s starting date.
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priori, the monetary authority could have an incentive to use inflation so as to affect the rate at
which firms change prices, if such a policy were to have positive welfare effects. However, the
fact that price-setting firms choose their prices optimally implies that, in the timeless perspective
regime with zero inflation, a marginal increase in the rate of inflation has no effect on firms’ profits,
and therefore it has no effect on the rate of adjustment. This envelope property implies that the
monetary authority has no incentive to deviate from zero inflation in order to affect the speed of
price adjustment.
We also show that the same reasons for which zero inflation is optimal under Calvo pricing
continue to hold under stochastic menu costs. First, inefficient price dispersion is minimized at
zero inflation. Second, in the timeless perspective regime with zero inflation, the marginal welfare
gain from raising output towards its socially efficient level (i.e. a movement along the Phillips
curve) exactly cancels out with the marginal welfare loss from committing to and generating
expectations of future inflation (i.e. an upward shift of the Phillips curve). This finding echoes
Kydland and Prescott’s “rules versus discretion” but is orthogonal to whether pricing is time- or
state-dependent.3
The following section lays out the model and derives the conditions for equilibrium. Section 3
sets up the optimal monetary policy problem and obtains the main result regarding the optimality
of zero inflation from the timeless perspective; it also formalizes the main intuition with a simplified
version of the model (with the full proof in the Appendix). Section 4 analyzes numerically the case
with positive government expenditure; for a plausible calibration of the model, we find that the
optimal deviations from strict price stability in response both to productivity and to government
spending shocks are indistinguishable from zero.4 Section 5 concludes with a discussion of a possible
extension.
2 Model
There are three types of agents: households, firms, and a monetary authority. We begin by
describing the behavior of households and firms.
3Independently, Lie (2009) studies optimal monetary policy in a New Keynesian model with stochastic menu
costs and a monetary friction.
4Existing studies of optimal monetary policy with monopolistic distortions have proved analytically the existence
of a short-run trade-off between inflation and output stabilization in the presence of positive government spending
(Benigno and Woodford, 2005; Woodford, Ch. 6, section 5). However, they do not quantify the importance of this
trade-off. Our results suggest that, at least in a model with stochastic menu costs, the trade-off is negligible.
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2.1 Households
A representative household maximizes the expected flow of period utility u (Ct) − x (Nt;χt) , dis-
counted by β, subject to
Ct =

 1
0
C
(−1)/
it di
/(−1)
and  1
0
PitCitdi+R
−1
t Bt = WtNt +Bt−1 + Πt,
where Ct is a basket of differentiated goods i ∈ [0, 1] , of quantity Cit and price Pit; Nt denotes
hours worked andWt is the nominal wage rate; χt is an exogenous preference shock to the disutility
of labor;5 Bt are nominally riskless bonds with price R−1t , and Πt are the profits of firms owned by
the household, net of lump-sum taxes.
The first order conditions are
u (Ct)wt = x
 (Nt;χt) , (1)
R−1t = βEt
u (Ct+1)
πt+1u (Ct)
, (2)
where wt ≡ Wt/Pt is the real wage, πt ≡ Pt/Pt−1 is the gross inflation rate, and the aggregate
price index is given by
Pt ≡

 1
0
P 1−it di
1/(1−)
.
2.2 Firms
There is a continuum of firms on the unit interval. Firm i’s production function is
yit = ztnit,
where zt is an exogenous aggregate productivity process. The firm’s labor demand thus equals
nit = yit/zt and its real cost function is wtyit/zt. The real marginal cost common to all firms is
therefore wt/zt. Optimal allocation of expenditure among product varieties by households implies
that each individual firm faces a downward-sloping demand schedule for its good, given by yit =
(Pit/Pt)
− yt.
Following Dotsey et al. (1999), we assume that firms face random lump sum costs of adjusting
prices (“menu costs”), distributed i.i.d. across firms and over time. Let G(κ) and g(κ) denote the
5Our results hold also in the case when the utility of consumption is affected by a preference shock; here we
ommit such a shock for simplicity.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 12 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1130
cumulative distribution function and the probability density function, respectively, of the stochastic
menu cost κ ≥ 0. We assume that a positive random fraction of firms draw a zero menu cost, so
that G (0) > 0.6 Assuming that κ is measured in units of labor time, the total cost paid by a firm
changing its price is wtκ.7
Let v0t denote the value of a firm that adjusts its price in period t before subtracting the menu
cost. Let vjt (P ) denote the value of a firm which has kept its nominal price unchanged at the level
P in the last j periods. This firm will change its nominal price only if the value of adjustment,
v0t − wtκ, exceeds the value of continuing with the current price, vjt (P ). Therefore, from the set
of firms that last reoptimized j periods ago (which we henceforth refer to as ’vintage-j firms’),
only those with a menu cost draw κ ≤ (v0t − vjt (P )) /wt will choose to change their price. The
real value of an adjusting firm is given by
v0t = max
P

Πt (P ) + βEt
u (Ct+1)
u (Ct)

G


v0,t+1 − v1,t+1 (P )
wt+1

v0,t+1 − Ξ1,t+1 (P )

+βEt
u (Ct+1)
u (Ct)

1−G


v0,t+1 − v1,t+1 (P )
wt+1

v1,t+1 (P )

,
where βu (Ct+s) /u (Ct) is the stochastic discount factor between periods t and t+ s ≥ t,
Πt (P ) ≡


P
Pt
− wt
zt


P
Pt
−
Yt
is the firm’s real profit as a function of its nominal price P , and
Ξj+1,t+1 (P ) ≡ wt+1
 (v0,t+1−vj+1,t+1(P ))/wt+1
0
κg (κ) dk
is next period’s expected adjustment cost for a firm currently in vintage j. The real value of a
firm in vintage j, as a function of its current nominal price P , is given by
vjt (P ) = Πt (P ) + βEt
u (Ct+1)
u (Ct)

G


v0,t+1 − vj+1,t+1 (P )
wt+1

v0,t+1 − Ξj+1,t+1 (P )

+βEt
u (Ct+1)
u (Ct)

1−G


v0,t+1 − vj+1,t+1 (P )
wt+1

vj+1,t+1 (P ) . (3)
We assume that J periods after the last price adjustment, firms draw a zero menu cost.8 This
6We make this technical assumption to ensure a unique stationary distribution of firms over price vintages in
the case of zero inflation. See the Appendix for details.
7Alternatively, we can assume that κ is measured in terms of the basket of final goods, in which case the total
cost paid by a firm changing its price is simply κ. The results are not dependent on this assumption.
8We make this assumption for tractability. It ensures a finite state space under zero inflation or when the support
of the menu cost distribution is unbounded from above.
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means that firms in vintage J−1 know that in the following period they will adjust their price with
probability one at no cost. Therefore, expression (3) holds for vintages j = 1, ..., J − 2, whereas
for vintage-(J − 1) firms the corresponding value function is
vJ−1,t (P ) = Πt (P ) + βEt
u (Ct+1)
u (Ct)
v0,t+1. (4)
The optimal price setting decision is given by
0 = Πt (P
∗
t ) + βEt
u (Ct+1)
u (Ct)

1−G


v0,t+1 − v1,t+1(P ∗t )
wt+1

v1,t+1 (P
∗
t ) , (5)
where
Πt (P ) =


wt
zt
− (− 1) P
Pt

(P )−−1 P t Yt.
Iterating (5) forward, and using the implications of (3) and (4) for the terms vj,t+j (P
∗
t ), j =
1, ..., J − 1, we can express the pricing decision as
P ∗t =

− 1
J−1
j=0 β
jEt
j
k=1 (1− λk,t+k)u (Ct+j)P t+jYt+j (wt+j/zt+j)J−1
j=0 β
jEt
j
k=1 (1− λk,t+k)u (Ct+j)P −1t+j Yt+j
,
where
λjt ≡ G


v0t − vjt
wt

(6)
denotes the period-t adjustment probability of firms in vintage j = 1, ..., J−1, and we define vjt ≡
vjt(P
∗
t−j) for short. As emphasized by Dotsey et al. (1999), this pricing decision is analogous to the
one in the Calvo model. In particular, the term
j
k=1 (1− λk,t+k) is the endogenous probability
that the price chosen at t survives for the next j periods, thus replacing the exogenous probability
1− λC
j
where λC is the constant adjustment probability in the Calvo model. We can rewrite
the price decision in terms of stationary variables as
p∗t =

− 1
J−1
j=0 β
jEt
j
k=1 (1− λk,t+k)
j
k=1 πt+k
	
u (Ct+j)Yt+j (wt+j/zt+j)
J−1
j=0 β
jEt
j
k=1 (1− λk,t+k)
j
k=1 πt+k
	−1
u (Ct+j)Yt+j
, (7)
where p∗t ≡ P ∗t /Pt is the optimal relative price and
j
k=1 πt+k = Pt+j/Pt is accumulated inflation
between periods t and t+ j.
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2.3 Market clearing
Labor input is required both for the production of goods and for changing prices. Labor demand
for production by firm i is nit = yit/zt = (Pit/Pt)
− yt/zt. Thus, total labor demand for pro-
duction purposes equals Δtyt/zt, where Δt ≡
 1
0
(Pit/Pt)
− di denotes relative price dispersion.
At the same time, the total amount of labor used by vintage-j firms for pricing purposes equals
ψjt
 (v0t−vjt)/wt
0
κg (κ) dk, where ψjt is the mass of firms in vintage j. Equilibrium in the labor
market therefore implies
Nt =
YtΔt
zt
+
J−1
j=1
ψjt
 (v0t−vjt)/wt
0
κg (κ) dk. (8)
Also, equilibrium in the goods market requires that
Yt = Ct +Gt, (9)
where Gt denotes government expenditure, which follows an exogenous process.
2.4 Inflation, price dispersion, and price distribution dynamics
All firms adjusting at time t choose the same nominal price, P ∗t . Given that no nominal price
survives for longer than J periods by assumption, the finite set of beginning-of-period prices at
any time t is

P ∗t−1, P
∗
t−2, ..., P
∗
t−J

. Let ψjt denote the time-t fraction of firms with beginning-of-
period nominal price P ∗t−j, for j = 1, 2, ..., J , with
J
j=1 ψjt = 1. The price level evolves according
to
P 1−t = (P
∗
t )
1− J
j=1
λjtψjt +
J−1
j=1

P ∗t−j
1−
(1− λjt)ψjt,
where adjustment probabilities {λjt}J−1j=1 are given by (6), and where λJ,t = 1. Rescaling both sides
of the above equation by Pt, we obtain
1 = (p∗t )
1− J
j=1
λjtψjt +
J−1
j=1

p∗t−jj−1
k=0 πt−k
1−
(1− λjt)ψjt. (10)
This equation determines the inflation rate πt, given

p∗t−j
J−1
j=0
and {πt−j}J−2j=1 . Similarly, price
dispersion follows
Δt = (p
∗
t )
− J
j=1
λjtψjt +
J−1
j=1

p∗t−jj−1
k=0 πt−k
−
(1− λjt)ψjt, (11)
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 15 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1130
where again λJ,t = 1. The distribution of beginning-of-period prices evolves according to
ψj,t = (1− λj−1,t−1)ψj−1,t−1 (12)
for j = 2, ..., J , and
ψ1t = 1−
J
j=2 ψj,t = λ1,t−1ψ1,t−1 + λ2,t−1ψ2,t−1 + ...+ ψJ,t−1. (13)
2.5 Equilibrium
There are 8 + 2J + (J − 1) = 7 + 3J stationary endogenous variables: Ct, Nt, Yt, Rt, πt, p∗t , wt,
Δt,

ψjt
J
j=1
, {vjt}J−1j=0 and {λjt}J−1j=1 . The equilibrium conditions are (1), (2), the J − 1 equations
(6), equations (7) to (11), the J laws of motion (12) and (13), the value functions
vjt =

p∗t−jj−1
k=0 πt−k
− wt
zt

p∗t−jj−1
k=0 πt−k
−
Yt
+βEt
u (Ct+1)
u (Ct)

λj+1,t+1v0,t+1 + (1− λj+1,t+1) vj+1,t+1 − wt+1
 (v0,t+1−vj+1,t+1)/wt+1
0
κdG (κ)

for j = 0, 1, ..., J − 2, and
vJ−1,t =

p∗t−(J−1)(J−1)−1
k=0 πt−k
− wt
zt

p∗t−(J−1)(J−1)−1
k=0 πt−k
−
Yt + βEt
u (Ct+1)
u (Ct)
v0,t+1;
plus a specification of monetary policy. If we were to close the model with a Taylor rule, this would
give us a total of 2+(J − 1)+5+J+J+1 = 7+3J equations. Instead, we will study the optimal
state-contingent monetary policy plan, which will essentially double the number of equations and
variables.
2.5.1 Flexible-price equilibrium
It is instructive to derive the flexible-price equilibrium in this framework. In such an equilibrium,
menu costs are zero and all firms choose the same nominal price P ∗t =

−1
wt
zt
Pt in each period t.
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All relative prices are one: p∗t = P
∗
t /Pt = 1. The equilibrium conditions simplify to
u(Cfpt )w
fp
t = x
(N fpt ;χt),
ztN
fp
t = Y
fp
t ,
Y fpt = C
fp
t +Gt,
zt =

− 1w
fp
t ,
and so we obtain the classical decoupling of real and nominal variables. The flexible-price output
Y fpt derived above is used in defining the output gap as the ratio between actual output and its
flexible-price counterpart.
3 Optimal monetary policy
For the purpose of deriving the optimality conditions of the Ramsey plan, it is useful to define
πaccjt ≡
j−1
k=0 πt−k =
Pt
Pt−j
, j = 1, ..., J − 1,
that is, the accumulated inflation between periods t − j and t. This implies
j
k=1 πt+k = π
acc
j,t+j.
We also define
θjt ≡
j−1
k=0 (1− λj−k,t−k) , j = 1, ..., J − 1,
i.e. the probability that a price chosen at t−j survives until t, which in turn implies
j
k=1 (1− λk,t+k) =
θj,t+j. These definitions allow us to express the optimal pricing decision in equation (7) in a more
compact form,
p∗t =

− 1
J−1
j=0 β
jEtθj,t+j

πaccj,t+j

u (Ct+j)Yt+j (wt+j/zt+j)
J−1
j=0 β
jEtθj,t+j

πaccj,t+j
−1
u (Ct+j)Yt+j
.
Similarly, we replace
j−1
k=0 πt−k by π
acc
jt in the laws of motion of inflation and price dispersion, and
in the firms’ value functions. It is useful to express the variables πaccjt and θjt recursively,
πaccjt = πtπ
acc
j−1,t−1, j = 1, ..., J − 1,
θ
acc
jt = (1− λjt) θaccj−1,t−1, j = 1, ..., J − 1,
where the recursions start with πacc0,t−1 = 1 and θ
acc
0,t−1 = 1, respectively. We usewt = x
 (Nt;χt) /u
 (Ct)
to substitute for the real wage in the equilibrium conditions. In addition, we use the constraint
Yt = Ct + Gt to substitute for Ct. Finally, we define v˜jt ≡ vjtu (Ct), j = 0, 1, ..., J − 1, such that
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(v0t − vjt) /wt = (v˜0t − v˜jt) /x (Nt;χt). At time 0, the central bank chooses the state-contingent
path for all endogenous variables which maximizes the following Lagrangian,
L0 = E0
∞
t=0 β
t{u (Yt −Gt)− x (Nt;χt)
+φp
∗
t

p∗t
J−1
j=0
β
j
θj,t+j(π
acc
j,t+j)
−1Yt+ju
 (Yt+j −Gt+j)−

− 1
J−1
j=0
β
j
θj,t+j(π
acc
j,t+j)
Yt+j
x

Nt+j;χt+j

zt+j

+φNt
 
Nt − YtΔt/zt −
J−1
j=1 ψjt
 (v˜0t−v˜jt)/x(Nt;χt)
0
κg (κ) dκ
!
+φπt
 
(p∗t )
1−J
j=1 λjtψjt +
J−1
j=1

p∗t−j/π
acc
jt
1−
(1− λjt)ψjt
!
+φΔt
 
(p∗t )
−J
j=1 λjtψjt +
J−1
j=1

p∗t−j/π
acc
jt
−
(1− λjt)ψjt −Δt
!
+
J−1
j=1
φ
λj
t

λjt −G


v˜0t − v˜jt
x (Nt;χt)

+
J
j=2
φ
ψj
t

ψj,t − (1− λj−1,t−1)ψj−1,t−1

+ φ
ψ1
t

ψ1t +
J
j=2
ψj,t

+
J−2
j=0
φ
vj
t


p∗t−j
πaccjt
u (Yt −Gt)−
x (Nt;χt)
zt


p∗t−j
πaccjt
−
Yt − v˜jt

+
J−2
j=0
φ
vj
t β

λj+1,t+1v˜0,t+1 + (1− λj+1,t+1) v˜j+1,t+1 − x

Nt+1;χt+1
  (v˜0t+1−v˜j+1,t+1)/x(Nt+1;χt+1)
0 κg (κ) dκ

+φ
vJ−1
t

p∗t−(J−1)
πaccJ−1,t
u (Yt −Gt)−
x (Nt;χt)
zt

p∗t−(J−1)
πaccJ−1,t
−
Yt − v˜J−1,t + βv˜0,t+1

+φ
πacc1
t [π
acc
1t − πt] +
J−1
j=2 φ
πaccj
t

πaccjt − πtπaccj−1,t−1

+φθ1t [θ1t − (1− λ1t)] +
J−1
j=2 φ
θj
t [θjt − (1− λjt) θj−1,t−1] }. (14)
Since the nominal interest rate only appears in the consumption Euler equation, the latter is
excluded from the set of constraints on the Ramsey problem. Instead, this equation is used
residually to back out the nominal interest rate path consistent with the optimal allocation. The
first-order conditions of the above problem are derived in the Appendix.
Our object of interest is optimal monetary policy from a “timeless perspective”. As explained
by Woodford (2003), this type of policy does not exploit the private sector’s expectations that
had formed prior to the particular date on which the plan is implemented. Instead, the central
bank commits itself to behave, from date 0, in a way consistent with the way it would have chosen
to behave had it committed to the optimal policy in the infinite past. The interest is thus in
optimality in the long run, once the economy has converged to its ergodic distribution.
The Appendix proves the following result.
Proposition 1 Let functional forms for preferences be of the constant elasticity type and govern-
ment expenditure be zero. Then the zero inflation policy (πt = 1) is optimal from the timeless
perspective.
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There are two important aspects of the above result. The first one is that optimal trend
inflation is zero. Therefore, the presence of monopolistic distortions does not justify a positive rate
of trend inflation, and the optimal policy involves a commitment to eventually eliminating any
inefficient price dispersion due to staggered price setting. This normative prescription is the same
as the one implied by the standard New Keynesian model with Calvo price setting, as shown by
Benigno and Woodford (2005).9 The main insight of the Calvo framework, about the desirability of
zero long-run inflation, thus continues to hold in a general model of state-dependent pricing. The
key difference between exogenous-timing models of price adjustment such as Calvo’s and state-
dependent pricing models is the endogeneity of the timing of price adjustment in the latter. A
priori, the central bank could have an incentive to use trend inflation so as to influence the speed
at which firms change prices, if such a policy were to have beneficial effects on society. The above
result implies that the endogeneity of price adjustment frequencies does not affect the optimality
of zero trend inflation.
To understand the intuition for this result, let us consider the different welfare effects of trend
inflation. First, in the presence of staggered price adjustment, inflation increases the extent of price
dispersion in the economy. This is inefficient, as it increases the amount of labor effort needed
to satisfy a certain level of consumption demand, and hence it lowers welfare. Price dispersion
attains a minimum at zero inflation, because all relative prices end up being equal. Second, a
commitment to positive inflation has two opposing effects on the output-inflation trade-off. On
the one hand, holding constant inflation expectations, a rise in current inflation allows to raise
output towards its socially efficient level, thus reducing the monopolistic distortion and improving
welfare; intuitively, the economy moves along the New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC).10 On
the other hand, committing to higher inflation raises the inflation expectations of price-setters;
the latter produces an upward shift of the NKPC, thus worsening the short-run trade-off between
output and inflation. As it turns out, at zero inflation the marginal welfare cost of raising inflation
expectations exactly offsets the marginal welfare benefit of exploiting the short-run output-inflation
trade-off.
While the former two effects are common to exogenous-timing models such as Calvo or Taylor,
the model with idiosyncratic menu cost shocks includes two additional welfare effects of trend
9The same result holds for another prominent exogenous-timing model of price adjustment, namely the Taylor
model, where adjustment probabilities are zero for a number of periods after a price change and one afterwards. A
proof of the latter result is available upon request from the authors.
10The “New Keynesian Phillips curve” is the structural relationship between inflation (current and expected) and
output that arises in the standard New Keynesian model. Here, the optimal price decision (equation 7) and the
relationship between inflation and optimal relative price (equation 10) can be combined into a dynamic relationship
between inflation and real marginal costs, where the latter can also be expressed in terms of aggregate output
by using equations (1), (8) and (9). The resulting dynamic relationship between inflation and output may be
interpreted as a “New Keynesian Phillips curve”. Notice that the endogenous price adjustment frequencies, λjt,
affect the position of that relationship.
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inflation. First, inflation forces firms to spend resources (menu costs) on adjusting their nominal
prices; this distortion is minimized at zero inflation, because eventually all firms end up being at
their optimal price. The second one is more subtle. In the stochastic menu costs model, adjustment
frequencies are endogenous. In particular, a change in trend inflation affects the relative prices of
the different firm cohorts (p∗t−j/
j−1
k=0 πt−k, j = 0, ..., J − 1), thus affecting their profits, their value
functions, and ultimately their adjustment gains. A priori, the central bank may be tempted to
use inflation so as to influence the speed of price-adjustment, for instance if such a policy were
to shift the NKPC in a way that improved the output-inflation trade-off. However, the fact that
price-setting firms choose their prices optimally implies that, at zero inflation, a marginal increase
in the inflation rate has no effect on firms’ profits, and therefore it has no impact on adjustment
probabilities. This envelope property implies that the monetary authority has no incentive to
create inflation so as to influence the speed of price changes.
The second important aspect of the above result is that optimal deviations from zero inflation in
response to technology or preference shocks are also zero. Therefore, the occurrence of exogenous
disturbances does not justify temporary departures from strict price stability.11 The intuition is as
follows. There are four potential inefficiencies in the present model, related to: (1) the level and
volatility of price dispersion; (2) the volatility of the average markup; (3) the waste of resources due
to menu costs; and (4) the level of the average markup due to imperfect competition. Distortions
(1) to (3) are directly related to the friction in price-setting, and, absent idiosyncratic shocks to
desired prices, a policy of strict price stability eliminates all three by replicating the flexible-price
equilibrium and thus eliminating the incentives for price adjustment. Inefficiency (4) is a static
markup distortion due to monopolistic competition. As we have just seen, the optimal plan does
not involve a correction of this inefficiency because it is outweighed by the gains of committing to
zero inflation and achieving the minimum possible price dispersion in the long run, independently
of the price-setting policies followed by firms. The aforementioned envelope property, by which a
marginal increase in inflation leaves price adjustment frequencies unaffected, continues to hold as
the economy is hit by aggregate shocks.
3.1 An illustration with two cohorts
While the appendix provides the proof of the optimality of zero inflation in the full-blown model, it
is illustrative to formalize the above intuitions with a simplified version of the model. In particular,
we consider the case of J = 2 cohorts, such that firms that adjust their nominal price today may
or may not adjust in the following period, but adjust with certainty two periods after the last price
11This result coincides with the one of Benigno and Woodford (2005) for the standard New Keynesian model with
Calvo pricing. While their result is derived in a linear-quadratic approximation to the optimal monetary policy
problem, our finding is based on the exact non-linear welfare function and equilibrium conditions.
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change. To further simplify, we assume functional forms u (Ct) = log (Ct) and x (Nt;χt) = χtNt,
such that the real wage is wt = x (Nt;χt) /u
 (Ct) = χtCt. We also assume away government
spending, Gt = 0, such that Ct = Yt. To simplify the notation, let ψt ≡ ψ1t and λt ≡ λ1t denote
the measure and adjustment probability of firms in vintage 1. The measure of firms in vintage 2 is
then ψ2t = 1−ψt, and the law of motion of ψt is simply ψt = 1− (1− λt−1)ψt−1. Let also vt ≡ v1t
denote the value of firms in vintage 1. Finally, we define v˜0t ≡ v0t/Yt and v˜t ≡ vt/Yt, such that
(v0t − vt) /wt = (v˜0t − v˜t) /χ. Taking all these elements together, we have that the central bank
maximizes the following Lagrangian,
L0 = E0
∞
t=0 β
t

log (Yt)− χt
YtΔt
zt
− χtψt
 (v˜0t−v˜t)/χ
0
κg (κ) dκ
+φp
∗
t

p∗t

1 + β (1− λt+1) π−1t+1

− 
− 1


χtYt
zt
+ β (1− λt+1) πt+1
χtYt+1
zt+1

+φπt

(p∗t )
1− (λtψt + 1− ψt) +


p∗t−1
πt
1−
(1− λt)ψt − 1

+φΔt

(p∗t )
− (λtψt + 1− ψt) +


p∗t−1
πt
−
(1− λt)ψt −Δt

+φλt

λt −G


v˜0t − v˜t
χt

+ φψt

ψt + (1− λt−1)ψt−1

+φv0t


p∗t −
χtYt
zt

(p∗t )
− − v˜0t + β

λt+1v˜0,t+1 + (1− λt+1) v˜t+1 − χt
 (v˜0,t+1−v˜t+1) /χ
0
κg (κ) dκ

+φvt


p∗t−1
πt
− χtYt
zt


p∗t−1
πt
−
− v˜t + βv˜0,t+1

.
For the purpose of this analysis, it suffices to differentiate the Lagrangian with respect to inflation
and the optimal relative price for a particular state at time t. While the derivative of the Lagrangian
with respect to πt captures the direct marginal effect of inflation on welfare, the derivative with
respect to p∗t captures its indirect effect through its structural relationship with the optimal relative
price. That relationship is given by the equation multiplied by φπt in the Lagrangian. Indeed, if
we use the latter equation to solve for the optimal relative price as a function of current and past
inflation, and then use the resulting expression to substitute for p∗t in the optimal price decision
(the equation multiplied by φp
∗
t ), we obtain a dynamic relationship between inflation and aggregate
activity. The latter may be interpreted as a “New Keynesian” Phillips curve. The derivatives with
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respect to πt and p∗t are given by
∂L0
∂πt
= φp
∗
t−1

p∗t−1
πt
(− 1)− 
− 1
χtYt
zt


π−1t (1− λt)
+

φ
π
t (− 1)
p∗t−1
πt
+ φΔt 
 
p∗t−1
−
π−1t (1− λt)ψt (15)
+φvt

(− 1)
p∗t−1
πt
− χtYt
zt
 
p∗t−1
−
π−1t ,
∂L0
∂p∗t
= φp
∗
t

1 + β (1− λt+1) π−1t+1

−

φ
π
t (− 1) p∗t + φΔt 

(p∗t )
−−1 (λtψt + 1− ψt)
−βEt

φ
π
t+1 (− 1)
p∗t
πt+1
+ φΔt+1

(p∗t )
−−1
πt+1 (1− λt+1)ψt+1 (16)
+φv0t


χtYt
zt
− (− 1) p∗t

(p∗t )
−−1 + βEtφ
v
t+1


χtYt+1
zt+1
− (− 1) p
∗
t
πt+1

(p∗t )
−−1
πt+1,
respectively.12 We now conjecture that the central bank commits to follow a policy of zero net
inflation, or πt = 1. It is straightforward to show that under such a policy the economy converges to
an equilibrium in which p∗t = Δt = 1. That is, both firm vintages have the same relative price, and
price dispersion is eliminated. Both vintages thus end up having the same value, v0t = vt, which
in turn implies λt = G(0) ≡ λ¯ > 0. The vintage distribution converges to ψt = 1/

2− λ¯

≡ ψ¯.
Finally, the real marginal cost equals the inverse of the monopolistic mark-up, χtYt/zt = (− 1) /,
implying that output equals its flexible-price level of section 2.5.1 at all times.
Imposing the latter conjecture in expressions (15) and (16), we obtain
∂L0
∂πt
= −φp
∗
t−1

1− λ¯

+

φ
π
t (− 1) + φΔt 
 
1− λ¯

ψ¯, (17)
∂L0
∂p∗t
= φp
∗
t

1 + β

1− λ¯

−

φ
π
t (− 1) + φΔt 

ψ¯ − β

1− λ¯

Et

φ
π
t+1 (− 1) + φΔt+1

ψ¯, (18)
where we have also used the fact that λ¯ψ¯ + 1 − ψ¯ = ψ¯. The first effect to notice is that, under
our conjecture, all terms involving the Lagrange multipliers φv0t and φ
v
t in expressions (15) and
(16) have disappeared. Such terms capture the marginal welfare effect of both variables through
their effect on the value of both firm cohorts (v0t, vt). Therefore, once the economy has converged
to the timeless perspective regime with zero inflation, a marginal deviation of inflation from zero
has no effect on adjustment gains and thus on price adjustment frequencies. This is the “envelope
property” that we referred to before.
12Both derivatives have been rescaled by βt times the probability of reaching the particular state at time t
conditional on the state at time 0.
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In equation (17), the term involving φp
∗
t−1 captures the marginal welfare effect from an increase
in time-(t− 1) expectations of inflation at time t, whereas the term involving φp
∗
t in equation (18)
reflects the marginal welfare effect from an increase in the optimal relative price (and thus in
inflation) at time t. We show in the Appendix that, in the full-blown model, the multiplier φp
∗
t
converges to a constant value φ¯p
∗
in the timeless perspective regime, which is also true in this
simplified version. Using this in (18), setting the resulting expression equal to zero (as required by
the first-order optimality condition) and solving for φπt , we obtain
φ
π
t =

φ¯
p∗
/ψ¯ − φΔt 
	
/ (− 1) .
Using this to substitute for φπt in (17), the latter becomes
∂L0
∂πt
=
 
φ¯
p∗
/ψ¯ − φΔt + φΔt 
! 
1− λ¯

ψ¯ − φ¯p
∗ 
1− λ¯

= φΔt (− )

1− λ¯

ψ¯ + φ¯
p∗
(1− 1)

1− λ¯

(19)
= 0 + 0 = 0.
Therefore, once the economy has converged to the timeless perspective regime with zero inflation,
the central bank has no incentive to create positive or negative inflation at the margin, because any
potential welfare gains cancel out with the potential costs. The term involving φΔt in (19) captures
the marginal welfare effect of inflation through its effect on price dispersion, which disappears under
the timeless perspective regime with zero inflation. Finally, the term involving φ¯p
∗
is the difference
between the positive marginal effect stemming from a movement along the NKPC, φ¯p
∗ 
1− λ¯

,
and the negative marginal effect due to the shift in the NKPC, −φ¯p
∗ 
1− λ¯

. Under the zero
inflation policy, both effects exactly cancel each other out.
The specific example above is intended to formalize the main intuition; more generally, the
optimality of zero inflation from the timeless perspective holds for any number of cohorts and for
standard (isoelastic) preferences, as shown in the Appendix.
4 Optimal policy with positive government expenditure
The previous section derived the optimal policy under the assumption that government expenditure
is zero. We now briefly analyze the more general case with positive government expenditure. In this
case we no longer have a closed-form analytical solution so we illustrate the results by simulation.
We show the optimal dynamic responses of several key variables to two types of shocks: to aggregate
productivity and to government consumption. Our main finding is that, under a first- or second-
order approximation to the general equilibrium dynamics of the model, the optimal deviations of
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inflation from zero are indistinguishable from zero. Therefore, the optimal stabilization policy is
basically equivalent to strict inflation targeting, and all real variables follow closely their flexible-
price counterparts. We also show that the responses are virtually identical to the ones obtained in
the Calvo model.
4.1 Calibration
To produce impulse responses we must first choose functional forms and assign values to the model’s
parameters. We take most of the parameters from Golosov and Lucas (2007). In particular,
u (Ct) = C
1−γ
t /(1 − γ) with γ = 2, and x (Nt) = χN1+ϕt /(1 + ϕ) with χ = 6 and ϕ = 1. The
discount factor is β = 1.04−1/4 and the elasticity of substitution among product varieties is  = 7.
We further assume that the cumulative distribution function of menu costs takes the form
G (κ) =
ξ + κ
α+ κ
,
where both ξ and α are positive parameters. Therefore, from equation (6) the fraction of vintage-j
firms that adjust their price in a given period equals
λjt = G


v0t − vjt
wt

=
ξ + (v0t − vjt) /wt
α+ (v0t − vjt) /wt
.
As in Costain and Nakov (2011), this function is increasing in the gain from adjustment v0t − vjt
and is bounded above by 1. Unlike Costain and Nakov (2011), the function is bounded below not
by 0 but by ξ/α > 0.We make this technical assumption to ensure a unique stationary distribution
of firms over the (finite number of) price vintages in the case of zero inflation. Any arbitrarily
small ξ would work and so we pick the value 10−10. We then set α = 0.0006 so that, under a
policy targeting 2% annual inflation (broadly consistent with the average observed rate in the US
since the mid-1980’s), the model produces an average frequency of price changes of once every
three quarters (broadly consistent with the micro evidence found e.g. by Nakamura and Steinsson,
2008). With these settings, the model implies virtually zero probability of adjustment when the
gain from adjustment is zero. Finally, we set the maximum price duration to J = 24 quarters, a
number which is much greater than any observed price duration in recent US evidence.
Figure 1 shows the adjustment hazard function and the distribution of firms by price vintage
with 2% trend inflation. In the left panel, the adjustment probability increases rapidly with price
age, reaching 90% after ten quarters. As shown in the right panel, this implies that virtually no
price survives more than eight quarters.
We focus on two types of shock. One is an aggregate productivity shock with persistence
ρz = 0.95 and the other is a government expenditure shock with persistence ρg = 0.9. Government
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expenditure is calibrated so that it accounts for roughly 17% of GDP in steady-state, consistent
with US postwar experience.
4.2 Impulse-responses under the optimal policy
We use a first-order Taylor expansion to approximate the equilibrium dynamics of our model.
Figure 2 plots the responses of several variables of interest to two independent shocks: a 1%
improvement in aggregate productivity, and a 1% increase in the level of government spending.
Characteristically, four variables — the optimal reset price, inflation, price dispersion (shown in
the last row of the figure), and the output gap, defined as the ratio between actual output and
its flexible price counterpart (and shown in the third panel on the top row), remain constant in
response to each of the shocks. This is precisely what happens in response to the same shocks in
the Calvo model (not shown due to the overlap, but available on request). Moreover, the responses
of the interest rate, consumption, hours worked and wages, all coincide with their counterparts
in the Calvo model. Hence, the central bank’s incentives to deviate from zero inflation so as to
reduce monopolistic distortions are virtually inexistent in response to the two real shocks.
In passing we note that a second-order accurate solution of the model yields virtually identical
impulse-responses, both under Calvo and under stochastic menu costs, at least for small aggregate
shocks.13 We thus find that the simple linear Calvo framework offers a very good approximation
to the behavior of a cashless state-dependent pricing economy under the optimal monetary policy
from the timeless perspective, even though the two economies may behave quite differently under
suboptimal policies.
5 Conclusion
We have shown that the main lessons for optimal monetary policy derived in the canonical Calvo
model carry over to a more general setup in which firms’ likelihood of adjusting prices depends
on the state of the economy. In particular, the optimal long-run rate of inflation is zero, and the
optimal dynamic policy is strict inflation targeting. This means that the central bank should not
use inflation to try to offset the static distortion arising from monopolistic competition. These
results lend support to more informal statements about the suitability of the Calvo model for
studying optimal monetary policy despite its apparent conflict with the Lucas (1976) critique.
Our analysis is a step toward a fuller model including firm-level shocks not only to the price
adjustment costs, but also to desired prices, e.g. due to idiosyncratic productivity shocks.14 In this
13We use 24 vintages when approximating the solution to first order, and 8 vintages when approximating it to
second order. When plotted, the two sets of impulse-responses are indistinguishable to the naked eye.
14A simple extension with firm-level shocks to desired prices is to assume that such shocks happen with a
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extended model, monetary policy would not be able to replicate the flexible-price equilibrium “for
free”, because firms with different productivities would want to set different prices. To achieve full
price flexibility monetary policy would have to be so volatile as to induce all firms to continuously
adjust their prices. This would entail maximum resource costs for price adjustment, which in all
likelihood is a sub-optimal outcome.
On the other hand, local deviations from price stability are unlikely to affect significantly the
overall rate of adjustment. On the margin they would shift the balance between the fraction of
price increases and the fraction of price decreases, with potential welfare gains coming from this
rebalancing. The magnitude of such a welfare effect of inflation is an intriguing question which we
leave for future research.
constant probability. If the shocks to desired prices are large so that adjustment to them brings gains exceeding
some maximum menu cost, then prices would be flexible with respect to the micro-level shocks, but sticky with
respect to aggregate shocks. By construction, in this environment our analysis from section 3 would go through.
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Appendix
In this appendix we obtain the solution to the optimal monetary policy problem from the timeless
perspective. The central bank maximizes the Lagrangian given by expression (14) in the main
text. The first-order conditions are as follows (all expressions are equal to zero),
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ψjt
x (Nt;χt)
Ljtg (Ljt)−
J−1
j=1
φ
λj
t g (Ljt)
1
x (Nt;χt)
−φv0t +
J−2
j=0
φ
vj
t−1 [λj+1,t − Lj+1,tg (Lj+1,t)]+φ
vJ−1
t−1 ,
(v˜0t)
φ
N
t ψjt
1
x (Nt;χt)
Ljtg (Ljt)+φ
λj
t g (Ljt)
1
x (Nt;χt)
−φvjt +φ
vj−1
t−1 [1− λjt + Ljtg (Ljt)] , (v˜j=1,...,J−1, t)
−x (Nt;χt)−
J−1
j=0
φ
p∗
t−j

− 1θjt(π
acc
jt )
Yt
x (Nt;χt)
zt
+ φNt

1 +
J−1
j=1
ψjt
x (Nt;χt)
x (Nt;χt)
(Ljt)
2 g (Ljt)

+
J−1
j=1
φ
λj
t g (Ljt)Ljt
x (Nt;χt)
x (Nt;χt)
−
J−1
j=0
φ
vj
t
x (Nt;χt)
zt


p∗t−j
πaccjt
−
Yt
+
J−2
j=0
φ
vj
t−1x
 (Nt;χt)
 
(Lj+1,t)
2 g (Lj+1,t)−
 Lj+1,t
0
κg (κ) dκ
!
, (Nt)
−φNt
Yt
zt
− φΔt , (Δt)
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−φπ
acc
1
t −
J−1
j=2 φ
πaccj
t π
acc
j−1,t−1, (πt)
where we have defined the adjustment gain Ljt ≡ (v0t − vjt) /wt = (v˜0t − v˜jt) /x (Nt;χt) for com-
pactness. We now conjecture that the timeless-perspective optimal policy involves zero net infla-
tion at all times, πt = 1. Under such a policy, in the timeless perspective regime (that is, after all
transitional dynamics have disappeared) the economy converges to the following equilibrium,
πt = p
∗
t = Δt =

− 1
x (Nt;χt)
ztu (Ct)
= 1 = πaccjt , j = 1, ..., J − 1
v0t = vjt ⇒ Ljt = 0, j = 1, ..., J − 1
λjt = G (0) ≡ λ¯ > 0⇒ θjt =

1− λ¯
j
, j = 1, ..., J − 1
ψjt =

1− λ¯
j−1
J−1
k=0

1− λ¯
k ≡ ψ¯j,
Nt =
Yt
zt
=
Ct +Gt
zt
for all t. That is, all firms end up having the same relative prices; price dispersion is eliminated;
the average price mark-up is constant at the level / (− 1), such that output, employment and
consumption equal their flexible-price levels of section 2.5.1 at all times; adjustment gains are zero;
and the vintage distribution converges to a stationary distribution. Imposing our conjecture in the
first-order conditions, we obtain
0 = 1 +
Ytu
 (Ct)
u (Ct)
J−1
j=0
φ
p∗
t−j

1− λ¯
j − φ
N
t
ztu (Ct)
+
J−1
j=0
φ
vj
t

1 +
u (Ct)Yt
u (Ct)
− − 1


, (20)
0 = φp
∗
t Et
J−1
j=0
β
j

1− λ¯
j
Yt+ju
 (Ct+j)−

φ
π
t (− 1) + φΔt 


λ¯
J−1
j=1
ψ¯j + ψ¯J

−Et
J−1
j=1
β
j

φ
π
t+j (− 1) + φΔt+j
 
1− λ¯

ψ¯j, (21)
0 = −φp
∗
t−j

1− λ¯
j
Ytu
 (Ct) +

φ
π
t (− 1) + φΔt 
 
1− λ¯

ψ¯j + φ
πaccj
t − βEtφ
πaccj+1
t+1 , (22)
0 = −φp
∗
t−(J−1)

1− λ¯
J−1
Ytu
 (Ct) +

φ
π
t (− 1) + φΔt 
 
1− λ¯

ψ¯J−1 + φ
πaccJ−1
t , (23)
0 = φ
θj
t − βEtφ
θj+1
t+1

1− λ¯

, j = 1, ..., J − 2, (24)
0 = φ
θJ−1
t , (25)
0 = φ
λj
t + βEtφ
ψj+1
t+1 ψ¯j + φ
θj
t

1− λ¯
j−1
, j = 1, ..., J − 1, (26)
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0 = φπt + φ
Δ
t − β

1− λ¯

Etφ
ψ2
t+1 + φ
ψ1
t , (27)
0 = φπt + φ
Δ
t + φ
ψj
t − β

1− λ¯

Etφ
ψj+1
t+1 + φ
ψ1
t , j = 2, ..., J − 1, (28)
0 = φπt + φ
Δ
t + φ
ψJ
t + φ
ψ1
t , (29)
0 = −
J−1
j=1
φ
λj
t
g (0)
x (Nt;χt)
− φv0t + λ¯
J−2
j=0
φ
vj
t−1 + φ
vJ−1
t−1 , (30)
0 = φ
λj
t
g (0)
x (Nt;χt)
− φvjt +

1− λ¯

φ
vj−1
t−1 , (31)
0 = −1−
J−1
j=0
φ
p∗
t−j

− 1

1− λ¯
j Ntx (Nt;χt)
x (Nt;χt)
+
φ
N
t
x (Nt;χt)
−
J−1
j=0
φ
vj
t
x (Nt;χt)Nt
x (Nt;χt)
, (32)
0 = −φNt
Yt
zt
− φΔt , (33)
0 = −φπ
acc
1
t −
J−1
j=2 φ
πaccj
t . (34)
We now use equations (20) to (33) to solve for the Lagrange multipliers. From (25) and (24), it
follows immediately that
φ
θj
t = 0, j = 1, ..., J − 1. (35)
Equations (27) to (29) allow us to solve for the φ
ψj
t multipliers, obtaining
φ
ψ1
t = −

φ
π
t + φ
Δ
t

,
φ
ψj
t = 0, j = 2, ..., J. (36)
Using (35) and (36) in equations (26), we obtain
φ
λj
t = 0, j = 1, ..., J − 1. (37)
Using the latter, equations (30) and (31) can be expressed compactly as φvt = Aφvt−1, where
φvt = [φv0t ,φv1t , ...,φ
vJ−1
t ]
 and
A
J×J
=
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
λ¯ λ¯ λ¯ ... λ¯ λ¯ 1
1− λ¯ 0 0 ... 0 0 0
0 1− λ¯ 0 ... 0 0 0
... ... ... ... ... ... ...
0 0 0 ... 1− λ¯ 0 0
0 0 0 .. 0 1− λ¯ 0
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
.
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The matrix A has J − 1 eigenvalues with modulus equal to 1 − λ¯ < 1 and one unit eigenvalue.15
The system is thus stable and the elements in φvt converge to finite values that depend on initial
conditions. Therefore, in the timeless perspective regime, in which all transitional dynamics have
disappeared, the multipliers φvjt converge to constant values φ¯
vj , j = 0, ..., J − 1. We then use (32)
to solve for φNt , obtaining
φ
N
t = x
 (Nt;χt)

1 +

− 1
Ntx
 (Nt;χt)
x (Nt;χt)
J−1
j=0

1− λ¯
j
φ
p∗
t−j +
x (Nt;χt)Nt
x (Nt;χt)
J−1
j=0
φ¯
vj

.
Using the latter in (20), we obtain

Ytu
 (Ct)
(−)u (Ct)
+
Ntx
 (Nt;χt)
x (Nt;χt)

J−1
j=0

1− λ¯
j
φ
p∗
t−j =
1

+

1

− u
 (Ct)Yt
(−)u (Ct)
− − 1

x (Nt;χt)Nt
x (Nt;χt)

J−1
j=0
φ¯
vj ,
where we have used the fact that, under our conjecture, x (Nt;χt) / [ztu
 (Ct)] = (− 1) /. At this
point, we assume away government spending, Gt = 0, such that Yt = Ct. We also assume that
functional forms for preferences are of the constant elasticity type. Let σ ≡ (−)Ctu (Ct) /u (Ct)
and ϕ ≡ Ntx (Nt;χt) /x (Nt;χt) denote the constant elasticities of marginal consumption utility
and marginal labor disutility, respectively. Then we have
J−1
j=0

1− λ¯
j
φ
p∗
t−j =
1/
σ + ϕ
+
1/− σ − ϕ (− 1) /
σ + ϕ
J−1
j=0
φ¯
vj ≡ Ξ.
It can be shown that all J − 1 roots of the characteristic polynomial
J−1
j=0

1− λ¯
j
xJ−1−j have
modulus equal to 1 − λ¯ < 1, hence they all lie inside the unit circle. Therefore, in the timeless
perspective regime, the multiplier φp
∗
t converges to the constant value φ¯
p∗ ≡ Ξ/
J−1
j=0

1− λ¯
j
.
Using this in equation (21), together with λ¯
J−1
j=1 ψ¯j+ ψ¯J = ψ¯1 and ψ¯j =

1− λ¯
j−1
ψ¯1, the latter
equation can be expressed as
0 = Et
J−1
j=0
β
j

1− λ¯
j "
φ¯
p∗
Yt+ju
 (Ct+j)−

φ
π
t+j (− 1) + φΔt+j

ψ¯1
#
= Et
J−1
j=0
β
j

1− λ¯
j
Σt+j (38)
where we have defined Σt ≡ φ¯
p∗
Ytu
 (Ct)−

φ
π
t (− 1) + φΔt 

ψ¯1. All J − 1 roots of the polynomialJ−1
j=0 β
j

1− λ¯
j
xJ−1−j have modulus equal to β

1− λ¯

< 1 and are thus inside the unit circle.
15Every column of A sums to unity, which implies that unity is an eigenvalue of A (Hamilton, 1994, p. 681). But
A is also a Leslie matrix, hence it has only one positive and dominant eigenvalue. (Poole, 2006, p. 328). Hence, all
other eigenvalues must lie inside the unit circle.
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Therefore, equation (38) has a unique solution given by Σt = 0, or equivalently
φ¯
p∗
Ytu
 (Ct)−

φ
π
t (− 1) + φΔt 

ψ¯1 = 0, (39)
which pins down the multiplier φπt as a function of the variables Ytu
 (Ct) and φ
Δ
t . The latter
multiplier is in turn determined by equation (33).
Equation (23) can be solved for φ
πaccJ−1
t , obtaining
φ
πaccJ−1
t =

1− λ¯
J−1 "
φ¯
p∗
Ytu
 (Ct)−

φ
π
t (− 1) + φΔt 

ψ¯1
#
= 0,
where we have used ψ¯J−1 =

1− λ¯
J−2
ψ¯1 and where the second equality follows from (39). Using
Etφ
πaccJ−1
t+1 = 0 and ψ¯J−2 =

1− λ¯
J−3
ψ¯1 in equation (22) for j = J−2, the latter implies φ
πaccJ−2
t = 0.
Operating in the same fashion, equations (22) for j = 1, ..., J − 3 imply that φπ
acc
j
t = 0 for j =
1, ..., J − 3.
It only remains to check that equation (34) holds given the solution of the Lagrange multipliers.
This is trivial, as we have already shown that φ
πaccj
t = 0 for j = 1, ..., J − 1.
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Fig.1: Price adjustment probability and firm distribution by vintage
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